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Abstract 
 
One of the most striking changes in labor market policy of the past fifty years has come 
in the form of legislation to limit discrimination in the workplace based on race, gender, 
disability and age. If such measures are to be effective in ending discrimination, they 
need to be enforced. The latter is dependent on state and federal agencies such as the 
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and ultimately the willingness of courts to 
find in favor of plaintiffs.  Courts also play an important role in the evolution of anti-
discrimination policy since past decisions create future precedent. This paper asks 
whether the number of charges filed with government agencies depends on the method by 
which judges are selected. Popularly elected judges should be expected to have more pro-
employee preferences (selection) and should move closer to employee preferences 
(incentives). This should result in fewer anti-discrimination charges being filed in states 
that appoint their judges. In line with this prediction, this paper uses data on the number 
of employment discrimination charges filed for the period 1973-2000 and finds that states 
that appoint their judges have fewer anti-discrimination charges being filed. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
One of the most striking changes in labor market policy of the past fifty years has come 
in the form of legislation to limit discrimination in the work place based on race, gender, 
disability and age.  But if such measures are to be effective in achieving their goals, they need to 
be enforced.  The latter is dependent on agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission and ultimately the willingness of courts to find in favor of plaintiffs who file for 
discrimination.  Courts also play an important role in the evolution of anti-discrimination policy 
since past decisions create future precedent.  If the enforcement process is too lax, discrimination 
will continue to remain unchecked.  Yet, if it is too lenient, there is scope for “rent-seeking” with 
excessive numbers of charges being filed.  Either way, we would expect the number of charges 
of discrimination filed to reflect court behavior.   
 
This paper looks at a particular aspect of this issue by asking whether the number of 
charges filed depends on the method by which judges are selected.  If judges are popularly 
elected, we would expect those with more pro-employee preferences (selection) and a move in 
decisions that are closer to employee preferences (incentives).  This should result in fewer anti-
discrimination charges being filed in states that appoint their judges. 
 
We use state level data to investigate whether judicial selection methods affect the 
number of employment discrimination charges filed in a panel of states for the period 1973-
2000.  Such charges are an important source of evidence since the judiciary has played a key role 
in policy implementation in this area.  Although a charge of discrimination may be resolved at 
the agency level, courts are the venues of last resort.  Even though the vast majority of claims are 
settled outside the court, the generosity of settlements reached in court will affect the decision to 
file.  This is because any pre-trial bargaining is affected by the expected outcome if there were 
litigation.  Because both trial and appellate courts interpret statutes, judges are involved in 
creating policy.  Court decisions expand or contract a given statute insofar as decisions involve a 
court’s application of the statute to a particular set of facts.  These statutory interpretations are 
binding decisions not only on the parties to the agreement but to future litigants.  The fact that 
collectively the judiciary can change the thrust of policy towards those who perceive 
discrimination can also affect the decision to file a charge of discrimination. 
 
Our results show that states that appoint their judges have lower levels of discrimination 
charges compared to those that use some form of election.  This holds for aggregate 
discrimination charges and for charges disaggregated into racial, gender and age discrimination.   
The results hold up also when we instrument for whether a state uses judicial appointments using 
other similar institutions within the state (whether a state permits popular initiatives and 
referendums, and whether the state elects its public utility commissioners).  Finally, we consider 
whether the results are driven by incentive or selection effects.  Here we find evidence that it is 
submitting judges to re-election which matters rather than the mode of initial appointment.  
 
This paper fits into an emerging literature by economists on judicial selection and its 
consequences.1  None of this literature to date has looked at the impact of judicial selection on 
                                                 
1 The existing body of work supports the view that appointed judges behave differently compared to elected 
judges. Suggestively, Bohn and Inman (1996) find that whether a constitutional restriction on deficit finance is 
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the decision to file a charge. Nonetheless, this is an important dimension affecting the use of 
resources in the enforcement process.   
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the next section, we discuss the 
background theoretical considerations that motivate our analysis.  Section III discusses the 
background facts and the institutional settings of the state court systems and the employment 
discrimination statutes.  Sections IV and V discusses data and the empirical estimation strategy 
while section VI develops the results.  Section VII explores the issue of whether the results are 
driven by a selection or incentive argument.  Conclusions and directions for future research are 
in section VIII. 
 
II.  Theoretical Considerations 
 
The main idea of the analysis is that the expected return to filing a discrimination charge 
is higher in states where judges have preferences and incentives that make them more pro-
employee.   
 
A. The Decision to File 
 
Suppose that employee  i   in state  s   at date  t   believes that an employer  k   has 
discriminated against her.  Then in an economic model of the decision to file a charge, she will 
compute the expected return from doing so and compare it with expected costs.  This expected 
return depends in general on three things: the employee’s characteristics  istx  , the employer’s 
characteristics ksty , and features of the state judicial system stϕ .  For simplicity, we suppose for 
the time being that the latter comprises only whether the judges in state s at time t are elected or 
appointed, i.e. { },st a eϕ ∈ .   
 
To be realistic, we suppose that only a small fraction of charges are actually litigated.  
We model this in a standard way. 2  Let ( ): , ,ist kst stF d x y ϕ   be the conditional distribution of 
damages.  We assume that ( ) ( ): , , : , ,ist kst ist kstF d x y a F d x y e< , i.e. the distribution of 
                                                                                                                                                             
effective depends on whether the responsible court is elected or appointed. Restrictions with appointed courts do not 
appear effective in their data. Hanssen (2000) tests the idea that appointment leads to greater judicial independence 
by looking at staffing levels in three budgetary agencies that are subject to judicial review: public utility 
commissions, insurance commissions and education bureaucracies. He argues that the kind of defensive activity that 
more independent judiciaries engage in will result in them having more staff. Using cross-sectional data for 1983, he 
shows that states with elected judges have significantly smaller bureaucracies after controlling for a number of other 
observables. Hanssen (1999) looks at whether states that elect their judges have more or less litigation activity, 
arguing that this may reflect the degree of uncertainty in the operation of courts. Using data from all 50 states, he 
tests whether there are significantly more public utility disputes (1978-83), and High Court and Trial Court Filings 
(1985-94) in states that elect their judges. The main finding, identified from cross-sectional differences, after 
controlling for a number of economic and demographic variables, is that appointing states have significantly higher 
rates of judicial activity in public utility disputes and High Court Filings, but not in Trial Court Filings. 
 
2 This asymmetric information model follows Bebchuk (1984).  The basic thrust of our argument would also hold in 
the well-known model of Priest and Klein (1997) where potential litigants are symmetrically informed, but uncertain 
about the outcome from litigating. 
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damages in an appointing state first order stochastically dominates the distribution of damages in 
an electing state.  Below, we will discuss reasons why we would expect this to be true.  We 
suppose that only a small fraction of charges are actually litigated.  We model pre-trial 
bargaining in a standard way.  The employer is assumed to be fully informed about the 
likelihood of success and circumstances of the discrimination case.  The uninformed party (the 
employee) then makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the employee of ikstb .  The employer then 
accepts or rejects the offer. If he rejects, then the case goes to trial, while if he accepts, then the 
case is settled out of court. Let court costs be kstC for the employer and  istc   for the employee.  
The offer will be accepted if  
( )ikst ikstb d C< +  
since, by assumption, realised damages  ikstd   are observable to the employer.  The optimal pre-
trial offer maximizes: 
( ) ( ) ( )
0
(1 : , , : , , .kst
b C
kst ist kst st ist ist kst stb F b C x y z c dF d x yϕ ϕ−− − + −∫  
This yields: ( ) ( ) ( )(1 : , , : , , 0.ikst kst ist kst st kst ist ikst kst ist kst stF b C x y C c F b C x yϕ ϕ∗ ∗− − − + − =  
This defines a cut off level of damages above which all cases are settled.  From this equation, it 
is clear that the system of election or appointing judges does not have a clear-cut prediction for 
the amount of litigation even if damages are more lenient under one regime.3  This is because it 
is the hazard function of the distribution of damages which determines  ikstb
∗  .  However, there is 
a clear-cut prediction on the expected return from filing: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
0
: , , (1 : , , : , , .ikst kst
b C
ist kst st ikst ikst kst ist kst st ist ist kst stE R x y b F b C x y z c dF x yϕ ϕ ε ϕ
∗ −∗ ∗= − − + −∫  
This is lower in states that have appointed judges.  Hence, for a given distribution of costs, we 
should expect fewer charges to be filed (other things being equal) in states that appoint their 
judges. 
 
B.  Judicial Selection   
  
A key premise of the analysis above is that judicial selection affects the distribution of 
damages.  We now discuss the theoretical justification for this. 
 
Selection: Even though politicians who appoint judges are themselves accountable to the 
electorate, there is likely to be a difference between the kinds of judges who are elected and 
appointed because issues are “bundled” in general elections.4  This allows organized interests to 
have a greater influence on non-salient policy issues in general elections.  Since anti-
discrimination is unlikely to be salient for a large group of citizens, this suggests that employers 
– who are typically more organized than workers -- are able to influence judicial appointments 
more in states that appoint judges.  States that use elections give a direct say to citizens and are 
likely to yield populist judges who weight employee interests more heavily. 
                                                 
3 This parallels some of the results on the incidence of strikes in asymmetric bargaining models – see, for example, 
Hayes (1984).   
4 Besley and Coate (2000, 2003) make this argument formally and apply it to citizens’ initiatives and elected versus 
appointed regulators. 
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Incentives:  Electing judges can also influence the decisions that they make when seeking re-
election.  This argument is developed in Maskin and Tirole (2004).  Their argument hinges on 
the fact that voters are less informed about the correct judicial decision than judges.  By making 
more employee friendly judgements, an elected judge will signal that their preferences are more 
congruent with those of the electorate.   
 
In either case, the welfare consequences of judicial selection are uncertain.  If the 
political system is biased against employees in the first place, then electing judges can help to 
redress this balance.  However, it can also lead to a system which creates long-run costs on all 
citizens if leniency in anti-discrimination policy becomes a punitive tax on businesses.  Some 
charges brought may constitute a form of rent-seeking which can create social waste.  
 
III. Institutional Background 
 
This section provides background details on the process of filing charges and selecting 
judges.   
 
A.  The Role of Courts in Interpreting State Laws 
 
For a matter to be heard by a state court, the state must prohibit the type of alleged 
discrimination in a statute or in its constitution.5  Protection against employment discrimination 
can be covered by state and/or federal law.  The federal law was intended to serve as an umbrella 
statute providing universal protection for all workers regardless of the existence of a state law.  
Most states, however, have enacted a statute prohibiting employment discrimination that is 
broader than the federal law.  In general, it is expected that a claim of employment 
discrimination will be pursued using the state court process and then pursued in federal court as a 
last resort. To protect one’s rights in both federal and state courts, however, a charge of 
discrimination must be filed with the state or federal agency responsible for overseeing such 
charges within a fixed period subsequent to the alleged act of discrimination.  Once a charge is 
filed in one agency (state or federal), there is a process in place whereby the other agency will be 
notified, thus reducing the cost of having to file separate charges in both the state and the federal 
agencies, thus ensuring that an individual’s rights are protected under both sets of laws. 
 
Once filed, a charge may be resolved by the agency (e.g. through an investigation, 
mediation, or agency action) or the individual may decide to drop his claim.  If the matter is not 
resolved or dropped, the individual will have the option of bringing a court action in the 
appropriate state trial court.6  A trial court is considered to be a court where the judge and/or jury 
are a “trier of fact.”  As the trier of fact, after hearing the evidence the trial court will decide 
whether an employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee based on its interpretation 
of how the facts fit the law upon which the charge of discrimination is based.  If the losing party 
is dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, that party can only appeal the decision if the 
party disagrees with the court’s interpretation of the law.  Thus, the courts that oversee the 
                                                 
5  A description of these state laws is provided in the next section.   
6 Alternatively, the individual could bring an action in federal court.  In most instances, the state law will apply first 
with the federal law providing protection when the state law is not applicable. 
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actions taken by the trial courts are known as appellate courts.  These courts can reverse the 
findings of a trial court only if the trial court erred in its interpretation of the law.  Appellate 
courts do not have the authority to re-try a case and these courts cannot re-interpret the facts of 
the case. 
 
In some states there is only one level of appellate courts.  In other states there are two 
levels.  In the instance where there is only one level, once that court has rendered its decision, 
there is no further recourse for the parties in the state court system.  In the instance where there 
are two levels of appellate courts, then a decision made at the lowest appellate level can be 
appealed to the highest appellate court.  In most states, the second level of appellate court (often 
called the state “Supreme Court”) has some discretion over the matters which it will agree to 
hear.  Thus, an aggrieved party that failed to win at the first level of appellate court may or may 
not be able to pursue an appeal at the second level of appellate courts.7 
 
The path an aggrieved employee will follow through the court system is illustrated in 
Figure 1. The first step begins with an employee or a job applicant deciding that he has been 
discriminated against by an employer.  In the case of an employee, this could stem from the 
employee not getting a promotion or salary raise, being demoted, or being forced to retire or 
resign.  Once the alleged discrimination occurs, the employee (or job applicant) has to decide 
whether to file a charge of discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission (“EEOC”) or relevant state agency within a fixed period.  In states for which there 
is no state law against the particular type of discrimination, the charge must be filed within 180 
days of the date on which the alleged discrimination occurred.  In states for which there is a state 
law against the particular type of discrimination, the charge must be filed within 300 days of the 
date of the alleged discrimination. 
 
Once a charge is filed with one agency (federal or state), the agency then is required to 
contact the employer and to seek conciliation between the employee and employer.8  At the 
agency level, there are several possible resolutions, three of which are described as follows.  
First, the agency can dismiss the charge if the employee has failed to provide the necessary 
information to support his claim of discrimination.  Second, the agency can investigate the matter 
and decide whether to issue a “right to sue” letter.  At this point, the agency may encourage the 
parties, through mediation or some other process, to settle the matter.  Third, the agency can 
decide to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the employee against the employer for the alleged 
discrimination. 
 
Although the agency may be involved in investigating the alleged discrimination, the 
actions of the agency are not binding on the parties.  Depending on the type of alleged 
discrimination (age, race, sex, disability, etc), after a certain period has passed, regardless of the 
actions (or inaction) the agency has taken, the employee may ask the agency for a right to sue 
letter and move the matter into the judicial system.  Only in the case where the agency has 
                                                 
7 For a more comprehensive review of state judicial process, see Carp and Stidham (2001).  For an overview of the 
issues concerning judicial selection, see Hall (2001).  
8 With respect to age discrimination, the state agency has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter for the first 60 days.  
After that, however, the matter may be handled by either the state agency or the EEOC. 
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decided to initiate a lawsuit on behalf of the employee is the employee prohibited from bringing 
his own lawsuit.9 
 
Under some state laws, an employee may not be required to file a charge of 
discrimination with the state agency (or EEOC) before filing a state court action.  In these states, 
however, if an individual decides to pursue a state court action without filing a charge with the 
EEOC, that individual loses her right to have the charge investigated.  Given the cost of filing a 
charge is nominal we should expect that an individual will file a charge before pursuing the state 
action.  The fee for filing a charge is nominal given a lawyer is not needed for an agency 
investigation, and the agency will undertake the expense associated with investigating the 
charge.  To pursue a court action, an individual is likely to incur the expenses of retaining a 
lawyer, will have to pay court filing fees, and pay for legal fees associated with pursuing the 
preliminary aspects of the case (e.g. discovery).  Thus, we expect that, in most instances, an 
employee will pursue a charge before seeking court action.10  We explore this issue further in 
Section IV. 
 
B.  Judicial Selection 
 
Historically, legislative and constitutional requirements for the selection of judges have 
relied very little on individual characteristics.  Indeed, there are few qualifications to become a 
judge.  Moreover, there is no prescribed training program for would-be judges.  Judges have 
tended to be older white males (Carp and Stidham, 2000, p. 269).  The average starting age of a 
state trial judge is 46 while that of a state appellate judge is 53.  On the whole, the party 
affiliation of a state judge mirrors that which dominates in the judge’s state.  Regardless of the 
method used to select the judges, most judges were politically active before assuming the bench. 
 
At the federal level, all judges are appointed and serve for life.  At the state level, judges 
may be appointed, elected, or selected using a combination of appointment and election.  In all 
but a few states (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island), judges serve a limited term 
and must be re-selected to serve additional terms.  The methods used to select judges, in general, 
have followed four historic phases.  With the founding of the United States, judges were initially 
selected through some type of appointment by either the state legislature or the governor.  In the 
1820s, during the period of Jacksonian Democracy, many states switched their selection scheme 
to one that involved a partisan election.  By 1860, 24 of the 34 states in existence selected their 
judges under this method. 
 
In the Progressive era at the end of the 19th century, many states switched to non-partisan 
election of judges.  This was viewed as a compromise between giving the voters a say in 
selection and limiting politicking in the process.  The early to mid-1900s saw heated debates 
over judicial selection.  These debates lead to arguments in favor of a hybrid scheme that 
combined elements of appointment and election.  This hybrid scheme was first adopted by 
Missouri in 1940 whereby a judge was first appointed by a governor after he consulted with a 
                                                 
9 One of the benefits associated with having the agency initiate a lawsuit on behalf of the employee is that the 
employee is not responsible for retaining or paying fees of the lawyer that is needed to pursue the lawsuit. 
10 Our empirical analysis confirmed that the issue of whether a state allows an individual to go directly into court has 
no affect on the issue of whether the selection method of judges. 
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nominating commission comprised of lawyers and non-lawyers.  For subsequent terms, however, 
the judge would have to withstand a retention election in which voters could decide in a yes or 
no vote whether to keep the judge in office.11  Thus, while the judge does not have to run against 
another candidate to retain his office, he is subject to the whims of the voters in terms of whether 
he will be retained. 
 
The current situation reflects a patchwork of arrangements determined by historical 
circumstance.12  Most states use the same selection method for trial and appellate court judges.13  
We have grouped the states into three categories based on the method used for appellate court 
judges: appointed, elected, and hybrid.  An appointed state is one that uses only appointment as 
the means of selecting and retaining judges.  The appointment may include the use of a 
nominating commission and is by the governor or the state legislature.  An elected state is one 
that uses elections to select and retain judges.  These elections may be partisan or non-partisan 
elections.  A hybrid state is one that directs the governor to select a judge by appointment but 
then shortly thereafter (usually within two years of the initial appointment) the judge must be 
retained through a retention election. 
 
Table 1 puts the 48 continental states in one of three categories: those that elect their 
judges (22 states), those that appoint their judges (11 states), and those that use a combination of 
appoint and elect – the “hybrid” system -- (15 states).  There are striking regional patterns.  Most 
of the states in the eastern region of the U.S. appoint their judges, whereas most of those in the 
mid-west and southern regions elect their judges.  The states in the western regions of the U.S. 
either elect or use the hybrid method of judge selection.  There are two main regions where there 
is significant within region variation – regions 2 and 5.  These regions will receive particular 
attention in the empirical analysis below.   
 
Although many states tried to change their judicial selection method between 1970 and 
2000, few succeeded – a list is in column (4) of Table 1.14  In most states the selection method is 
dictated by the state’s constitution and to change the constitution requires approval by the state 
legislature, governor, and the voters.  The most prevalent reform has been from a non-partisan 
election method to a hybrid scheme.  Wyoming (1972), Arizona (1974), South Dakota (1980), 
and Florida (1976) enacted this type of change.  The next most popular change was from a 
partisan election method to a non-partisan election method.  This happened in Florida (1972), 
Louisiana (1974), Georgia (1983), Mississippi (1994), and Arkansas (2000).  Indiana (1970) and 
Tennessee (1994) switched from a partisan election method to a hybrid method.  New York 
(1977) switched from an appointment method that was based on partisan elections in the lower 
courts to an appointment method (with a nominating commission).  A handful of states, 
                                                 
11 This method of selection is also referred to as a “merit” selection plan.  It is termed merit because the initial 
appointment is by the governor in consultation with a nominating committee.  Throughout the paper, however, we 
use the term “hybrid” instead of merit.  In part this is due to the fact that some states are considered “merit” plan 
even if the appointment method is used for subsequent terms of a judge because the appointment is done in 
conjunction with a nominating commission.  We have chosen to treat these types of states as “appointed” states. 
12 See Bowers (2002) for a more complete history of judicial selection methods. 
13 As of 2000, the following states use a different selection method for some or all of the trial court judges: Arizona, 
California, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, North Carolina, and South Dakota. 
14 For a more comprehensive description of selection methods and the history of state changes in these methods, see 
www.ajs.org.  
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Maryland (1974), Vermont (1974), Delaware (1977), New York (1977), Wisconsin (1983), 
South Carolina (1996), added a nominating commission to its existing selection method.  Rhode 
Island (1994) switched from a method that appointed a judge via legislative election to an 
appointment by the governor in consultation with a nominating commission.  New Mexico 
(1988) added to its partisan election method a retention election for judges seeking additional 
terms. 
 
C. Employment Discrimination Statutes 
 
Most employees are covered by several federal statutes that prohibit employment 
discrimination based on such things as race, color, sex, age, national origin, religion, and 
disability.  With the exception of the statute concerning disabilities, the federal statutes were first 
enacted in the mid- to late 1960s.15  The statute covering disabilities was first enacted in 1990 
and became effective in 1992.16  The agency responsible for enforcing these laws is the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).  Prior to 1972, however, the EEOC was 
considered a “toothless tiger” because it did not possess sufficient enforcement power to pursue 
violators of the federal statutes.  EEOC’s authority was expanded in the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission Act of 1972.  Initially, the EEOC was not responsible for overseeing 
charges of age discrimination.  This changed in 1980 when authority over the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act was given to the EEOC.17 
 
In addition to the federal statutes, many states have enacted statutes that are similar to the 
federal statutes.  The state statutes often are more broadly worded and cover more types of 
employers and/or employees.  For example, in some states age discrimination applies to all 
individuals over the age of 18, whereas the federal statute only covers individuals over the age of 
40.  In some states, discrimination is prohibited for such things as marital status, sexual 
orientation, smoking, having a family history of certain diseases, and/or participating in political 
activities outside of the workplace.  Most of the federal statutes require the EEOC to defer 
charges it receives to the state agencies so that the agencies can first try to resolve the disputes 
using state laws, thereby treating the federal law as a “law of last resort.”18 
 
Although most state statutes reflect federal laws, there is variation when they were first 
enacted.  In some states, the statutes were enacted before the federal laws were enacted. In other 
states, the statutes were enacted subsequent to the federal laws.  A few states still do not have a 
statute that prohibits employment discrimination in the private sector. 
 
                                                 
15 The significant pieces of federal legislation are: The Equal Pay Act (enacted in 1963; requires equal pay for equal 
work), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (enacted in 1964; makes it illegal to discriminate in hiring, discharge, 
compensation, etc., on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (enacted in 1967; makes it illegal to discriminate against individuals over the age of 40 unless age 
is considered a bona fide occupational qualification). 
16 Enacted in 1990, the Americans with Disabilities Act requires employers to offer reasonable accommodation to 
disabled employees and bans discrimination against the disabled in wage determination, hiring, and firing. 
17 For a more detailed report on the role played by the EEOC in pursuing charges of discrimination and the federal 
laws covering, see www.eeoc.gov.   
18 Information regarding the relationship between the EEOC and state agencies and the role of state laws in 
resolving disputes can be found at www.eeoc.gov.  
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Table 2 reports the years in which prohibition of discrimination was first enacted on the 
basis of race, sex, age, or disability.  This table does not reflect modifications to the statutes that 
occurred subsequently for such things as: marital status, sexual harassment, sexual orientation, 
mandatory retirement, and/or mental disability.  With respect to prohibitions of race and sex 
discrimination, states in the southern part of the U.S. tended to be the last states to enact 
legislation.  Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi still do not have a statute for these types of 
discrimination.  With respect to prohibitions of age discrimination, states in the middle part of 
the U.S. in addition to some southern states were the last states to enact legislation.  With respect 
to the prohibition of discrimination with respect to disability, there is no clear-cut geographic 
distribution across the states. 
 
IV.  Data 
 
The empirical analysis studies the effect of the judicial selection method on the number 
of charges of employment discrimination brought in a state (to either a state or federal agency).  
Studying the selection issue using employment discrimination charges is ideal for several 
reasons.  First, initiating a charge is one-sided.  Only an employee (or potential employee) may 
file a charge.  Thus, our analysis is not confounded by the possibility of an employer (the other 
party with different interests) bringing a charge.  Second, given the existence of the federal 
statutes prohibiting the key types of employment discrimination (race, sex, age, disability), the 
role played by the state statutes are likely to minimized.19  As such, our analysis is able to 
concentrate on the role played by the method used to select judges and is not as confounded by 
the intricacies of the state statutes as might exist with another type of court action. 
 
We obtained under the Freedom of Information Act data on all employment charges filed 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) since 1970; the charges 
concerning claims of age discrimination start in 1980.20  The EEOC receives approximately 
80,000 charges on alleged employment discrimination practices by private employers per year.21  
Approximately 39 percent of all charges are given priority investigative and settlement efforts 
due to the early recognition that discrimination has likely occurred.  Approximately 57 percent of 
all charges require further investigation to determine if a violation has occurred.  The remaining 
charges are dropped due to jurisdictional limitations or unsupported claims of discrimination. 
 
                                                 
19 As revealed by Collins (2001), with respect to race, 98 percent of non-southern blacks were already covered by 
the state laws well before the adoption of the federal law.   As such, in many instances the existence of the state laws 
well before our analysis also limits the impact of the laws on our analysis.  Collins (2001) as well as Neumark and 
Stock (2001), however, do find modest impacts of these laws on the employment of blacks and women. 
20 EEOC’s role with respect to age discrimination has changed over time.  Initially, the Department of Labor 
maintained administrative responsibility for investigating claims pertaining to age discrimination.  In 1979, the 
EEOC was given this responsibility. Given the state agencies and the EEOC communicate with each other 
concerning the filing of charges, the data we have from the EEOC reflect the pool of employees who are concerned 
enough about an employment practice to bring it to the attention of the government agency.  Thus, we do not have 
data on alleged acts of discrimination that are not brought to the attention of a state or federal agency.  Given that 
approximately 20 percent of all charges filed with the EEOC are closed because of reasons related to the employee 
not following up on the charge, there not being any statutory jurisdiction for the claim, or because the employee 
withdrew the charge, we think this is not a serious concern. 
21 Information on the charge and litigation statistics can be found at www.eeoc.gov.  
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Of total EEOC charges in 2001, 36 percent involved claims of race-based discrimination, 
31 percent involved claims of sex-based discrimination, 20 percent involved claims of age-based 
discrimination, and 20 percent involved claims of disability-based discrimination.22 Across these 
different categories, approximately 18 to 26 percent of the charges were closed without further 
action because of reasons related to the employee not following up on the charge, there not being 
any statutory jurisdiction for the claim, or because the employee withdrew the charge (which 
may or may not include private settlements between the employee and employer reached early in 
the charge process).  For approximately 55 to 63 percent of the charges, the EEOC failed to find 
a reasonable cause to support the claim of discrimination. If the EEOC fails to find a reasonable 
cause, this does not preclude the employee from bringing a private court action.  The remaining 
charges are settled quickly, go through some sort of conciliation process, and/or have a finding 
by the EEOC that there is a reasonable cause to support the alleged discrimination. 
 
In rare cases, the EEOC files a lawsuit on behalf of an employee.  In 2001, for example, 
only 32 age discrimination lawsuits (less than 10%) were initiated directly by the EEOC.23  The 
majority of lawsuits initiated by the EEOC are filed for claims concerning race or sex-based 
discrimination.  Even in these cases, it is still a small number relative to the charges brought.24 
 
The data from the EEOC contain much information on each charge filed.  Each record 
identifies the office in which the charge was filed, the basis for the alleged discrimination, 
characteristics of the employee, characteristics of the employer, and information on the actions 
taken by the EEOC (or related state agency) on the charge.  Two datasets were provided to us.  
The first dataset covers the early years (up to 1988).  The second dataset covers the period from 
1988 to 2001.  The first dataset provides information on the first three actions taken in the case.  
The second dataset provides information on the first five actions taken in the case. 
 
To construct the data set that we use, we identified those charges that involved a claim of 
race discrimination because the employee was black, sex discrimination because the employee 
was female, age discrimination, and/or discrimination based on one’s disability.  We excluded 
those charge records for which the record was closed because it was a duplicate record.  We then 
summed the number of charges filed per year in each state over the sample period. 
 
We study five categories of charges: (1) all charges (1973-2000), (2) charges with a claim 
of race discrimination by a black individual (1973-2000), (3) charges with a claim of sex 
                                                 
22 For any given charge, one may claim several types of employment discrimination.  While we do not study them, 
there can also be claims of discrimination based on religion or national origin as well as claims of discrimination 
based on the Equal Pay Act. 
23 In general, EEOC initiated lawsuits represent big actions.  For example, in 2000, the EEOC settled a class action 
suit for $300,000 of an age bias lawsuit against Enterprise Rent-A-Car in Texas. The lawsuit alleged that the 
company refused to hire individuals 40 years of age or older for management trainee positions.  Also in 2000, EEOC 
agreed to an $8 million settlement of an age discrimination case against AlliedSignal of Arizona on behalf of 48 
charging parties and approximately 300 class members. The lawsuit alleged that the company violated the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) when it laid off older workers at its Tempe and Phoenix facilities in 
1993 and 1994. 
24 A state agency could also pursue a lawsuit on behalf of the employee.  Whether the state agencies possess this 
ability is determined at the state level.  Information on the role the state agency plays beyond possessing powers 
similar to the EEOC to investigate charges, however, is difficult to obtain for all of the states. 
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discrimination by a female (1973-2000), (4) charges with a claim of age discrimination (1980-
2000), and (5) charges with a claim of disability discrimination (1993-2000). 
 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the EEOC charge data.  In Panel A, we report 
the overall mean number of charges per year per state, the standard deviation, the mean number 
of charges per 100,000 population, and the number of observations, respectively.  In column (1), 
we report the summary statistics across all states.  In columns (2) to (4), we report the summary 
statistics based on the method of judicial selection.  Overall, 2274 charges or 43 charges per 
100,000 population are filed per year per state.  Across the three selection methods, fewer 
charges are filed in states in which the judges are appointed.  On average, there are 1444 charges 
or 32 charges per 100,000 population filed in these states. There is a minimal difference in the 
number of charges filed in the elect and hybrid states.  On average, there are between 2469 and 
2599 charges per year filed in these two types of selection states. 
 
Panels B through E of Table 3 report the summary statistics for the four specific claims of 
discrimination that we are studying.  Note that for any given charge, an individual may assert 
more than one type of discrimination.  For example, a black woman may assert a claim of 
discrimination based on race and sex.  In each panel, we report the average percent of charges 
that claim only that type of discrimination.  On average, 85 percent of race charges claim only 
race discrimination; 81 percent of sex-based charges, 75 percent of age charges, and 73 percent 
of disability charges claim only one type of discrimination. 
 
With the exception of a claim of discrimination based on one’s disability, the fewest 
charges are filed in states in which the judges are appointed.  For claims of discrimination based 
on one’s disability, the average number of charges is lowest in the appointed states if we do not 
adjust for the population size.  After adjusting for the population of a state, however, there is 
little difference across the three types of states. 
 
Table 3 reveals that most of the charges involve a claim of racial discrimination.  Most of 
these charges are from the states with a higher proportion of blacks in the population.  The 
charges come primarily from the mid-atlantic, mid-western and southern regions of the United 
States.  If we divide the states into two groups, one with an above median proportion of blacks in 
the population and one with a below median proportion of blacks in the population, the 
distribution of charges across the three types of judicial selection states is somewhat similar.  For 
both groups, the fewest number of charges are filed in states in which the judges are appointed.  
In the states with an above median proportion of blacks, the highest numbers of charges are filed 
in the elected states.  In the states with a below median proportion of blacks, the highest number 
of charges are filed in the hybrid states.25 
                                                 
25 Appendix Table 1 reports the summary statistics for those states in regions 2 and 5 given these are the two regions 
with variations in the judicial selection method.  We have broken the states into three groupings based on the type of 
selection method.  In two states, Florida and New York, we report the summary statistics for the selection method 
that has been in place the longest over the sample period.  The first column reports the average per capita charges 
(and standard deviation) for all states.  Across all types of charges and the three types of judicial selection methods, 
the average charges for each state are within one standard deviation of the mean for all states in the category.  There 
are two exceptions.  The number of charges filed based on a claim of racial discrimination is above one standard 
deviation for Maryland and for Delaware.  For these states, the average number of charges is within two standard 
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In addition to providing information on the initiation of the charge process and the claims 
of discrimination, the EEOC data also provide some information about the disposition of a 
charge.  Because actions can be taken outside of the agency’s purview (e.g. settlements or future 
trials), the disposition information provided by the EEOC is not complete. In addition, the 
disposition could change over time (e.g. if an attempt at conciliation fails the disposition could 
be listed as a conciliation failure or something else if later in the handling of the matter a right to 
sue letter is issued).  Table 4, uses the information provided by EEOC to examine six types of 
dispositions: 
1. the agency failed to find a cause of action, 
2. benefits were given to the claimant (e.g. through conciliation or settlement) 
3. the case is closed (e.g. the claimant fails to pursue the action through the agency) 
4. the agency issued a right to sue letter, 
5. an attempt to resolve the matter through conciliation failed 
6. another type of disposition (e.g. the case went to trial) 
The reasons for closing a charge action encompass the employee no longer cooperating with the 
agency and a settlement outside of the EEOC or state agency process.  The “other” dispositions 
categories include things such as the EEOC pursuing a trial action and the EEOC becoming a 
party to a private lawsuit (one brought by the employee).  The statistics reported in Table 4 is the 
average number of total employment discrimination charges per year by type of judicial section, 
and the average of the percentages these charges that are resolved under one of the six identified 
resolutions.  It is important to note that the data reported in Table 4 should be viewed gingerly as 
it is difficult to reconcile the different dispositions with summary tables published by the EEOC.  
Across all judicial selection types, the majority of charges are ended at the EEOC stage with a 
finding of no cause or another type of disposition.  Recall that even without a finding of cause an 
employee may still pursue a legal action.  On average, there are more dispositions based on there 
being a no cause of action in the elected and hybrid states than in the appointed states.  There is 
also a higher percentage of right to sue letters issued in the elected and hybrid states than in the 
appointed states.  There are more charges closed with benefits in the appointed states than in the 
elected and hybrid states.  Table 4 suggests, anecdotally, that the types of charges filed and their 
dispositions differ across the states based on the method of judicial selection. 
 
If the employee does not gain a favorable settlement upon filing a charge of 
discrimination, he must decide whether to pursue a lawsuit against the employer in either state or 
federal court.26  Because states vary in the statutes that govern discrimination, we created a series 
of indicator variables that capture differences in state laws.  We use three dummy variables 
denoting whether the state statute covers race discrimination, age discrimination, and disability 
discrimination, respectively.27  We also generate indicator variables that identify three types of 
changes in the state statutes.  We have one variable that equals one if there was a change (in the 
                                                                                                                                                             
deviations of the overall average.  Thus, there is little evidence that any given state is an outlier with respect to the 
filing of charges. 
26If there is a state statute prohibiting age discrimination, the employee must decide whether to pursue his rights in 
state court or federal court.  In most instances, the state statute is broader than the federal statute and so the 
employee is likely to pursue an action in state court.  The employee and the employer, however, under limited 
circumstances may pursue the action in federal court.  The federal court may apply state or federal law, depending 
on the nature of its jurisdiction over the lawsuit. 
27 We do not have a dummy variable for gender discrimination because during the sample period, since if a state has 
a statute prohibiting race discrimination it usually also prohibits sex discrimination.   
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past three years) in the state statute that makes it easier for an employee to initiate a charge of 
discrimination. This would include, for example, extending the period in which an employee 
may file a charge and allowing for certain types of damages awarded to an employee.  We also 
use a dummy variable which equals one if the state eliminates mandatory retirement for most 
employees in the private sector.  This is a change in the statute that directly affects older 
workers, but also affects other types of workers because it expands the workforce by giving 
workers the right to work beyond the expected retirement age.  Finally, we created a dummy 
variable which equals one if the state statute is broad enough to protect employees for such 
things as being a smoker, participating in legal activities outside of work, and/or having certain 
genetic characteristics.  Potentially, as employment discrimination laws are amended to protect 
more characteristics of employees, the effectiveness of the laws is weakened.28 
 
The state level economic and demographic measures reflect time-varying measures that 
could affect the conditions under which an employee may decide to pursue a charge of 
employment discrimination.  For the economic measures we use the real per capita income (base 
year 1996), the unemployment rate and data on the structure of employment, specifically the 
proportion of employment in the service sector, financial sector and manufacturing.29  For the 
demographic measures we use state population, the percentage of the state population between 
ages of 45 and 59, 60 and 64, and 65 and older, and the percentage of the state population that is 
black.30  Table 5 reports the summary statistics for these measures. 
 
V. Method 
 
Our basic results are generated by the following specification: 
 
ststststrtst SXAC επθβλ ++++=     
 
where C is the total number of charges per 1000 population filed in state s in year t, λ is a set of 
region-year dummy variables, A is an indicator variable equal to one if the state appoints its 
judges to the highest level of appellate courts, X is a set of exogenous state level economic, and 
demographic measures, S is a set of measures identifying the types of state laws that prohibit 
employment discrimination, and ε is the residual.  We allow the residuals to be clustered at the 
state level. 
 
The inclusion of region specific year dummies implies that identification of the effecting 
of appointing judges is coming either from states that switched their method of appointment 
during our time period or from within region variation.  This boils down to cross-sectional 
variation within two regions – the mid-Atlantic and the southern regions (regions 2 and 5 in 
Table 1). 
 
                                                 
28 We have explored other measures to identify differences in the state statutes.  The coefficients on these other 
measures were not precisely measured, however.  As such, we have excluded them from our final analysis. 
29 These data come from the CPS. 
30 Note that for the year 2000, we do not have population estimates for the population between the ages of 45 and 
59, 60 and 64, and the population that is black.  As such, we use the 1999 values for 2000.   
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We also treat appointing judges as an endogenous variable.  This tries to deal with the 
concern that the choice of judicial institutions can be correlated with the error due to such as 
things omitted “judicial culture”.  As our instrument we use whether the state elects its public 
utility commissioners and/or institutions of direct democracy.  As we would expect if this is a 
measure of political culture and history, then the extent of democracy within a state characterized 
this way is negatively correlated with the probability that a state appoints its judges.  It is 
plausible to believe that this variable is not directly related to the judicial culture within a state.31  
We report the results using a GMM estimator (see Baum, Schaffer, and Stillman, 2004) as well 
as a jackknife instrumental variable (JIVE) method (Angrist, Imbens, and Krueger (1999)).32  
The latter, which is argued to have better properties than standard two stage least squares in 
small samples, constructs an instrument that is orthogonal to the disturbance in the second stage 
equation by calculating the fitted first stage values and the leverage from the first stage 
equation.33 
 
VI. Results 
 
Table 6 reports results for all discrimination charges. Column (1) shows that there is 
negative and significant relationship between appointing judges and total charges per capita 
filed.  The effect is equal to less than a one-standard deviation change in the number of charges 
filed per capita.  Of the other regressors that are included, only the percentage of black 
population is significant at a p-value of less than .01, suggesting that more charges are filed in 
states with larger black populations.   In addition, there are more charges filed in states with a 
higher proportion of employees in the financial sector.  The economic and demographic controls 
are significant (F-test = 5.99, p-value =0.000).  Column (2) adds in the statute controls.  A 
change in the procedure in the past two years and a broadly worded statute are negatively 
correlated with filing charges as is the presence of another group statute. After controlling for 
statutes, there is evidence of an effect of unemployment on filing charges suggesting that 
workers are more likely to do so when it is more difficult to become re-employed. 
 
In column (3), we check robustness by including three other measures of judicial 
institutions – whether the state has only one level of appellate courts, whether judges serve a life 
term, and judges salaries.  There is a negative and significant effect of not having a second layer 
of appellate courts.  This is also a negative and significant effect of life terms, suggesting that 
                                                 
31 In addition to exploring the results for only regions 2 and 5, we also excluded the three states for which there is no 
state statute prohibiting discrimination based on race.  The results when we exclude these states are similar to the 
results reported in the tables. 
32 The reported results under the IV GMM estimation are similar to the results if a standard 2SLS estimation is used.  
In both cases, however, if the instruments predicting the endogenous variable are only weakly correlated, the 
estimates are misleading.  The JIVE estimation technique attempts to deal with the weak instruments problem. The 
methodology for the jive estimation is done in three steps: first, the first stage regression is estimated and the 
leverage and the predicted values of the endogenous measure are obtained.  Second, an instrument (“jive”) is created 
by subtracting the leverage multiplied by the observed endogenous measure from the predicted endogenous measure 
divided by one minus the leverage.  Third, the constructed jive instrument is then used in a two stage least squares 
estimation.  Because the jive measure is one-dimensional the 2SLS estimation is just identified. 
33 We report the results from the “JIVE2” estimator explained in Angrist, Imbens, and Krueger (1999). 
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such judges are less likely to find in favor of discrimination.34  The size of the effect of 
appointing judges declines but the significance of the effect remains unaltered.  The effect of 
having an appointed judge on the bench is approximately a .61 of one standard deviation change 
in the number of charges filed per capita.  In column (4), we focus solely on the two regions that 
have within region variation.  The result once again holds up and stays similar in sign and 
significance.  Finally, columns (5) and (6) reports two stage least squares results which 
instruments the appointment variable using whether the state appoints or elects its public utility 
commissioners and rules for direct legislation, with column (6) reporting the results under the 
JIVE estimation method.35  The result remains negative and significant. 
 
Table 7 reports disaggregated charges for race, gender, age, and disability.  For each set 
of charges we report six different specifications.  In column (1), we consider a specification 
which controls only for state level economic and demographic variables.  In column (2) we add 
controls for the discrimination statutes.  Column (3) tests the robustness of the main findings by 
adding three other potentially relevant measures of judicial institutions – whether the state has 
only one level of appellate courts, the pay of judges, and whether the judges are granted life 
terms.  Column (4) repeats the results only for the two regions that have within region variation 
for whether the state appoints it judges.36  This is important as these regions are the ones from 
where most of the identification is coming. 
 
Panel A reports results for race discrimination charges.  The pattern of results is very 
similar to those in Table 6 with a robust negative and significant effect of appointing judges on 
charges filed.  Under the specification reported in column (4), the effect here is approximately 
.70 of one standard deviation change.  The results once again hold up across all specifications 
including the IV specification in columns (5) and (6).  There is relatively little evidence of the 
importance of statutes in affecting the rate of filing.  
 
Panel B looks at gender discrimination charges.  Again, the correlation with appointing 
judges is negative and significant.  The effect is approximately .50 of one standard deviation 
change in the left-hand side variable (specification reported in column (4)).  The results are again 
robust across the different specifications.  
 
In panel C we turn to age discrimination charges.  The coefficient is around .80 of one 
standard deviation in the left hand side variable.  The pattern of significance in the other 
variables seen in Table 6 is broadly repeated.   
 
                                                 
34 Only four states appoint their judges for life: Massachusetts (Region 1), New Hampshire (Region 1), Rhode Island 
(Region 1), and New Jersey (Region 2).  In New Jersey, a judge is initially appointed to a term of 7 year; upon 
reappointment the judge is then given a term of life. 
35 In the first stage regression for the estimation reported in column (5), the f-test on the instruments is quite strong 
with a heteroskedascticity robust statistic of 141.35.  The over-identification test, however, is not satisfied. In the 
first stage regression for the estimation reported in column (6), the f-test on the jive estimate is 99.57. 
36 We include the judicial culture measure of whether there is no second level of appellate court but exclude the 
other judicial culture measures.  We exclude the measure on the life term for the judge as only New Jersey gives 
their judges a life term in regions 2 and 5.  We exclude the measure on judge’s salaries given it is not statistically 
significant in the specification reported in column (3). 
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The findings in Table 6 do not hold up in panel D which looks only at disability 
discrimination.  There are two possible reasons.  First, there is a much shorter period in this case.   
Second, we might expect such discrimination charges to be less politicized and hence less 
influenced by judicial selection. Disability legislation expects employers to make “reasonable 
accommodations” in addition to simply prohibiting discrimination based on one’s disability.  As 
such, given that most employment discrimination claims are based on an existing employee 
being fired or demoted (as opposed to a potential employee not being hired), if the employers are 
not making the reasonable accommodation in the first place to hire the potential employee, the 
pool of employees who can allege that they have been unfairly treated because of their disability 
is very different from the pool of employees that may exist for other types of potential 
discriminatory practices.37 
 
Overall, the results provide evidence that states with appointed judges have smaller 
numbers of charges being filed.  The magnitude of the coefficient, however, ranges from .50 to 
1.65 of one standard deviation of the number of charges filed.  The effect of judicial selection is 
larger for charges involving a claim of race discrimination and smaller for charges involving a 
claim of sex discrimination. 
 
The results are consistent with the idea that judges who are accountable directly to 
citizens are more likely to favor employees in the decisions that they reach.  The results in 
columns (4) through (6) that look at the within regions 2 and 5 provide particularly compelling 
evidence since they look at variation in the judicial selection regime within culturally and 
historically similar groups of states. 
 
VII.  Selection versus Incentives 
 
We now test whether it is selection or incentives that matter.  Here, we make use of the 
fact that in the hybrid selection regime, judges are initially appointed, but subsequently held to 
account in retention elections.  If selection is at work, then we would expect those judges who 
are appointed initially by politicians to be different from those who are elected.  If incentive 
effects are at work, then we expect the results to show that it is judges who must be re-elected 
who are different (regardless of whether they were initially appointed or elected).38 
 
To look at this, we create a dummy variable which is equal to one in all states that 
initially appoint their judges, whether or not they are subject to re-election.39  Effectively, this 
amalgamates the hybrid and appointing regimes.40  Table 8 reveals that this variable is not 
significant for any of the charges that we considered.  This runs counter to the view that the 
                                                 
37 See Jolls and Prescott (2002) for a description of the issues pertaining to disability legislation. 
38 It is important to note that in states in which judges are elected, if a judge leaves office prior to the expiration of 
his term, usually the governor will appoint a successor to fill the vacancy until the next election.  Given this, the 
argument that the difference in the filing of charges due based on appoint/elect as a function of the selection effect is 
weakened if the judge who is appointed to fill the vacancy is also the judge that wins the subsequent election.  
39 In states that use election as their initial (and retention) method of selection, the governor often will appoint a 
judge before the first election if the retiring judge steps down prior to the election. 
40 For this analysis we use all 48 contiguous states as when we distinguish between appointed and hybrid schemes 
and election schemes there is within region variation for all regions except region 1. 
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selection of judges by politicians in appointment regimes reflects different preferences among 
the judiciary. 
 
We now add in a variable that identifies those states that use a retention election for the 
subsequent terms held by the judge.  The indicator variable on initial appointment is now 
negative and significant while that on the hybrid regime is positive and significant, more than 
offsetting the effect of appointment.41  Thus judges who are re-elected by the citizens behave 
much as judges who are elected in the first place whereas judges who are only ever elected are 
behind the results.  This finding is consistent with the incentive effect being important, but not 
with the view that selection is important.42 
 
VIII. Concluding Comments 
 
This paper shows that judicial selection matters in the implementation of anti-
discrimination policy.  States where judges are appointed see fewer charges for race, age and 
gender discrimination being brought.  This suggests that courts tend to favor workers in such 
states.  This comes both from the way in which individual judges affect outcomes and the 
collective precedents set by judicial intervention in interpreting statutes.  The results suggest that 
it is the use of re-appointment of judges using elections that matter most.  This is in line with the 
agency model of Maskin and Tirole (2004).  The results that we find are robust to a wide variety 
of estimation methods and choices of controls. 
 
The results confirm themes in the burgeoning empirical literature on the importance of 
judicial independence in affecting economic outcomes.  La Porta et al (2003) argue persuasively 
that countries with greater judicial independence are also those with better economic and 
political outcomes.  Traditionally, the main threat to judicial independence comes from the 
executive branch of government (see Glaeser and Shleifer (2002)).  However, independence may 
also mean insulating judges from mass opinion.  In this sense, the results are consistent with the 
view that appointing judges strengthens the independence of the judiciary as argued, for 
example, by Posner (1993). 
 
That said, the empirical findings are consistent with appointed judges acting more as 
agents of employers while those seeking re-election are agents of employees. This has obvious 
distributional consequences.  It may also affect real resource allocation by changing the incentive 
to use the filing process either to achieve redress against discrimination or as a form of rent-
seeking.   
                                                 
41 The reason why judges who face a retention election encourage more charges to be filed is not clear.  It is 
consistent with the idea that there is some kind of selection effect at work which yields a difference between judges 
who are initially elected and those who face only a retention election.  The exact mechanism at work here, however, 
is not entirely clear.  
42 Also consistent with the claim that incentives effects are paramount, we tested whether judges in appointing states 
appear to have significantly different ideologies compared to those in electing states.  While we did find some weak 
evidence that judges are actually more liberal in appointing states, this does not hold up to conditioning on state 
level economic and demographic characteristics. 
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Table 1: Selection Method of Judges, by State 
State Appointed Judge States Elected Judge States Hybrid Judge 
States 
Notes 
Region 1     
Connecticut Gov w/Nominating Commission    
Maine Governor Only    
Massachusetts Governor w/Nominating Commission   Nominating Commission is by Executive Order 
New Hampshire Governor Only w/Executive Council   Executive Council by Executive Order 
Rhode Island Governor w/Nominating Commission   In 1994 changed from appointment via legislative 
election 
Vermont Governor w/Nominating Commission   In 1974 switched from legislative appointment method 
Region 2     
New Jersey Governor Only    
New York Governor w/Nominating Commission   In 1977 changed from Governor only appointment from 
elected lower court judges 
Pennsylvania  Partisan Election 
w/Retention Election 
for Subsequent Terms 
  
Region 3     
Illinois  Partisan Election 
w/Retention Election 
for Subsequent Terms 
  
Indiana   Yes In 1970 method was changed from partisan election 
Michigan  Non-Partisan Election 
(considered Partisan) 
 No party affiliations on the ballot; candidates nominated 
at party conventions and run with party endorsements 
Ohio  Non-Partisan Election 
(considered Partisan) 
 No party affiliations on the ballot; candidates run in 
partisan primary elections and run with party 
endorsements 
Wisconsin  Non-Partisan Election  In 1983 the Governor established a council to 
recommend judicial candidates 
Region 4     
Iowa   Yes  
Kansas   Yes  
Minnesota  Non-Partisan Election   
Missouri   Yes  
Nebraska   Yes  
North Dakota  Non-Partisan Election   
South Dakota   Yes In 1980 method was changed from non-partisan election 
Region 5     
Delaware Governor w/Nominating Commission   In 1977 method was changed from Governor only 
appointment by Executive Order 
Florida   Yes In 1972 method was changed from partisan to non-
partisan election; In 1976 method was changed from 
non-partisan election to present 
Georgia  Non-Partisan Election  In 1983 method was changed from partisan election 
Maryland   Yes In 1974 method was changed from initial appointment by 
governor only to one requiring a nominating commission 
by Executive Order 
North Carolina  Partisan Election   
South Carolina Legislature w/Nominating Commission   In 1996 method added nominating commission 
Virginia Legislature    
West Virginia  Partisan Election   
Region 6     
Alabama  Partisan Election   
Kentucky  Non-Partisan Election   
Mississippi  Non-Partisan Election  In 1994 method was changed from partisan election 
Tennessee   Yes In 1994, method was changed from partisan election 
Region 7     
Arkansas  Non-Partisan Election  In 2000 method was changed from partisan election 
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Louisiana  Non-Partisan Election 
(could be considered 
Partisan) 
 In 1974 method was changed from  partisan election; 
currently party affiliations on ballot but candidates do not 
solicit party contributions and primaries open to all 
candidates 
Oklahoma   Yes  
Texas  Partisan Election   
Region 8     
Arizona   Yes In 1974 method was changed from non-partisan election 
Colorado   Yes  
Idaho  Non-Partisan Election   
Montana  Non-Partisan Election   
New Mexico  Partisan Election 
w/Retention Election 
for Subsequent Terms 
 In 1988 method was changed from partisan election 
Nevada  Non-Partisan Election   
Utah   Yes  
Wyoming   Yes In 1972 method was changed from non-partisan election 
Region 9     
California   Governor 
Appointment 
w/Retention 
Election 
 
Oregon  Non-Partisan Election   
Washington  Non-Partisan Election   
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Table 2:  First Year Discrimination Was Prohibited, by State and Type 
State Race Sex Age Disability 
Region 1     
Connecticut 1973 1973 1973 1973 
Maine 1971 1973 1971 1974 
Massachusetts 1972 1972 1972 1972 
New Hampshire 1971 1971 1971 1975 
Rhode Island 1971 1971 1971 1973 
Vermont 1971 1971 1981 1974 
Region 2     
New Jersey 1970 1970 1970 1972 
New York 1971 1971 1971 1974 
Pennsylvania Before 1970 Before 1970 Before 1970 No Statute 
Region 3     
Illinois 1971 1971 1971 1975 
Indiana 1971 1971 1971 1975 
Michigan 1972 1972 1972 1976 
Ohio 1973 1973 1978 1976 
Wisconsin 1974 1974 1974 1976 
Region 4     
Iowa 1970 1970 1972 1970 
Kansas 1970 1970 1983 1974 
Minnesota Before 1970 Before 1970 1977 1973 
Missouri 1978 1978 1986 1978 
Nebraska 1972 1972 1972 1973 
North Dakota 1979 1979 1979 1983 
South Dakota 1972 1972 No Statute 1986 
Region 5     
Delaware 1971 1971 1971 1988 
Florida 1977 1977 1977 1974 
Georgia No Statute No Statute 1971 1981 
Maryland 1970 1970 1970 1974 
North Carolina 1977 1977 1977 1977 
South Carolina 1979 1979 1979 1983 
Virginia 1987 1987 1995 1975 
West Virginia 1971 1971 1971 1981 
Region 6     
Alabama No Statute No Statute 1997 No Statute 
Kentucky 1972 1972 1972 1976 
Mississippi No Statute No Statute No Statute 1974 
Tennessee 1978 1978 1980 1987 
Region 7     
Arkansas 1993 1993 No Statute 1993 
Louisiana 1983 1983 1978 1980 
Oklahoma 1973 1973 1985 1981 
Texas 1983 1983 1983 1975 
Region 8     
Arizona 1974 1974 1980 1985 
Colorado Before 1970 Before 1970 Before 1970 1975 
Idaho Before 1970 Before 1970 Before 1970 No Statute 
Montana 1971 1971 1974 1974 
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New Mexico Before 1970 Before 1970 Before 1970 1973 
Utah 1975 1975 1975 1979 
Wyoming 1979 1979 1984 1985 
Nevada 1973 1973 1973 1973 
Region 9     
California 1970 1970 1970 1973 
Oregon Before 1970 Before 1970 Before 1970 1973 
Washington 1971 1971 1971 1973 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics on Employment Discrimination Charges 
 All States Elected Judge 
States 
Hybrid Judge 
States 
Appointed 
Judge States
Panel A     
Total Charges     
  Mean 2274.4 2468.7 2599.4 1444.4 
  (standard deviation) (2609.9) (2598.4) (2997.1) (1825.8) 
  Mean/100,000 Population 42.5 43.7 48.8 32.2 
  (standard deviation) (21.5) (21.5) (21.4) (17.5) 
  # of Observations 1344 656 384 304 
Panel B     
Charges based on Race Discrimination (Black)     
  Mean 832.6 1010.1 845.8 433.0 
  (standard deviation) (925.8) (1014.9) (895.6) (574.4) 
  Mean/100,000 Population 14.3 16.5 15.0 8.7 
  (standard deviation) (10.8) (11.6) (10.1) (7.6) 
  # of Observations 1344 656 384 304 
Panel C     
Charges based on Sex Discrimination (Female)     
  Mean 587.3 613.2 716.7 367.8 
  (standard deviation) (669.9) (617.0) (843.6) (442.3) 
  Mean/100,000 Population 11.8 11.6 14.0 9.4 
  (standard deviation) (5.3) (5.2) (5.2) (4.5) 
  # of Observations 1344 656 384 304 
Panel D     
Charges based on Age Discrimination     
  Mean 513.3 550.4 570.2 362.7 
  (standard deviation) (572.1) (586.5) (623.2) (432.0) 
  Mean/100,000 Population 9.6 9.5 11.2 7.8 
  (standard deviation) (5.4) (5.0) (6.3) (3.8) 
  # of Observations 1008 478 299 231 
Panel E     
Charges based on Disability Discrimination     
  Mean 638.4 661.7 741.2 453.4 
  (standard deviation) (619.3) (601.3) (723.9) (444.9) 
  Mean/100,000 Population 12.1 11.3 14.1 11.1 
  (standard deviation) (4.4) (3.7) (4.9) (4.3) 
  # of Observations 384 178 118 88 
 
Note:  Total charges and charges based on race or sex discrimination cover the period 1973 to 
2000.  Charges based on age cover the period 1980 to 2000.  Charges based on disability cover 
the period 1993 to 2000.  Only charges reported for the 48 contiguous states are used in the 
analysis. 
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Table 4: Distributions of Reported Resolutions of Charges by Type of Judicial 
Selection Method 
 
 Elected 
Judge States
Hybrid Judge 
States 
Appointed 
Judge States 
Mean Total # of Charges 57839 35649 15682 
 (Standard Deviation) (15948) (14064) (7170) 
% of Total Charges by Resolution:    
No Cause of Action 39.6% 36.1% 27.6% 
Closed w/Benefits 17.3% 15.2% 23.2% 
Closed (no other action) 12.0% 11.7% 9.0% 
Charges w/Right to Sue Letter 8.4% 9.0% 6.9% 
Charges where Conciliation Failed 5.8% 5.6% 5.0% 
Other Disposition 16.9% 22.3% 28.3% 
 
Note:  To create these statistics we summed per year across the three types of judge selection states and 
then took the average across all years.  “No cause of action” means that the agency did not find evidence 
of the alleged discrimination.  “Benefits” means that the case was closed after the employee was 
compensated for the alleged discrimination.  “Closed” means that the case was closed.  This could have 
occurred if the employee did not continue to pursue the charge of discrimination or if the case was settled 
outside of the agency’s jurisdiction.  “Right to sue” means that the employee was issued a right to sue 
letter by the agency.  “Conciliation failed” means that the attempt by the agency to resolve the dispute 
through mediation or negotiation failed.  “Other dispositions” covers all other types of dispositions which 
could include going to trial.  These statistics should be viewed gingerly as the statistics do not necessarily 
reflect the final disposition of the alleged charge of discrimination. 
 
Table 5: Summary Statistics of State Level Control Measures Used in the 
Regressions 
 
Measure Mean S.D. 
% Employed in Service Sector 24.87 5.32 
% Employed in Financial Sector 7.02 1.46 
% Employed in Durable Manufacturing Sector 8.62 4.07 
% Employed in Non-Durable Manufacturing Sector 6.31 3.37 
Real Per Capita Income (Per 1000, 1996 Base Year) 132.33 24.42 
Unemployment Rate (*100) 6.11 2.11 
State Population 5006296 5240564 
% of Population aged 45 to 59 (*100) 15.29 1.55 
% of Population aged 60 to 64 (*100) 4.23 0.46 
% of Population aged 65 + (*100) 11.94 1.97 
% of Population Black (*100) 10.78 9.12 
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Table 6:  Regression Analysis, All Charges 
Dependent Variable: Total Charges Per Capita (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
=1 if Appointed -19.347 -17.618 -13.043 -12.269 -11.923 -13.064 
 (4.357) (4.525) (5.083) (3.395) (2.374) (3.836) 
Real Per Capita Income (per $1000) 0.194 0.154 0.493 1.222 0.832 1.244 
 (0.563) (0.531) (0.508) (0.539) (0.289) (0.557) 
Real Per Capita Income Squared -2.812E-04 3.330E-06 -9.905E-04 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Unemployment Rate 1.406 1.688 2.037 1.108 0.751 1.088 
 (0.979) (0.858) (0.833) (0.739) (0.564) (0.772) 
% of Employed in Service Sector 0.339 0.481 0.192 4.034 4.490 3.892 
 (0.389) (0.426) (0.466) (0.931) (0.757) (0.986) 
% of Employed in Financial Sector 2.860 2.222 1.561 1.212 1.591 1.195 
 (1.021) (0.920) (0.938) (0.809) (0.640) (0.825) 
% of Employed in Durable Manufacturing Sector 0.397 0.392 0.192 4.980 4.948 4.865 
 (0.679) (0.600) (0.524) (1.629) (0.912) (1.525) 
% of Employed in Non-Durable Manufacturing Sector 0.619 0.491 0.237 0.941 1.016 0.947 
 (0.674) (0.587) (0.660) (0.245) (0.288) (0.256) 
State Population (per million) 0.497 0.558 -0.626 -6.567 -6.595 -6.606 
 (0.923) (0.789) (0.940) (1.513) (0.986) (1.571) 
State Population Squared -0.025 -0.022 0.020 0.218 0.221 0.222 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.060) (0.043) (0.065) 
% of Population between 45 and 59 3.862 4.202 2.742 0.579 0.568 0.563 
 (2.440) (2.296) (2.179) (4.128) (2.019) (4.141) 
% of Population between 60 and 64 -5.422 -6.764 -5.153 -14.969 -14.811 -14.747 
 (7.310) (7.284) (7.691) (9.077) (3.992) (9.118) 
% of Population 65 and Older -0.430 -0.040 0.160 1.581 1.564 1.557 
 (1.616) (1.646) (1.705) (1.866) (0.893) (1.886) 
% of Population Black 0.878 0.830 0.752 0.304 0.312 0.315 
 (0.235) (0.238) (0.259) (0.212) (0.203) (0.199) 
=1 if race statute  -3.041 -4.801 -11.992 -11.765 -11.673 
  (3.863) (3.778) (5.365) (2.693) (4.837) 
=1 if age statute  3.672 4.291 3.673 3.262 3.095 
  (3.957) (3.579) (3.986) (2.533) (4.140) 
=1 if disability statute  1.683 2.936 -4.503 -4.365 -4.308 
  (4.288) (4.772) (1.954) (2.378) (2.354) 
=1 if no mandatory retirement  -5.359 -6.510 2.554 2.697 2.755 
  (3.335) (2.922) (3.798) (2.054) (4.207) 
=1 if procedural change in last 3 years  -5.652 -5.559 -3.779 -3.723 -3.700 
  (1.970) (1.875) (2.144) (2.164) (2.059) 
=1 if broad state statute  -4.937 -4.378 -1.083 -1.284 -1.366 
  (2.742) (2.436) (2.579) (1.924) (2.932) 
No Second Level Appellate Court   -12.032 -18.539 -18.353 -18.278 
   (5.428) (1.987) (2.921) (2.319) 
Judge's Real Salary   -0.118    
   (0.113)    
Judge Serves for Life   -6.774    
   (3.554)    
region==     5.0000    27.772 28.592 26.880 
    (6.270) (4.296) (5.745) 
Fixed effects Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year Region, Year Region, Year Region, Year
Instrument Variables Specification No No No No GMM JIVE 
Observations 1344 1344 1344 308 308 308 
R-squared 0.6488 0.6694 0.6967 0.8617 0.8569 0.8616 
Note:  Standard errors reported in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors, 
clustered at the state level.  Columns (1) – (4) and (6) are clustered by state.  Coefficients in bold 
are statistically significant a p-value <0.01.  Coefficients in bold and italics are statistically 
significant at a p-value<0.05.  Coefficients in italics are statistically significant at a p-value<0.10.  
The regressions reported in Columns (4) through (6) cover only regions 2 and 5. 
 
Table 7: Regression Results, by Type of Discrimination 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A       
Dependent Variable: Race Charges/Population Based on Being Black       
=1 if Appointed -12.391 -11.278 -10.119 -7.534 -8.248 -8.574 
 (2.214) (2.141) (2.247) (2.014) (1.376) (2.279) 
Observations 1344 1344 1344 308 308 308 
R-squared 0.7939 0.8189 0.8276 0.8403 0.8354 0.8399 
Panel B       
Dependent Variable: Gender Charges/Population       
=1 if Appointed -4.360 -3.819 -2.433 -2.578 -2.442 -2.455 
 (1.152) (1.212) (1.198) (0.826) (0.645) (0.965) 
Observations 1344 1344 1344 308 308 308 
R-squared 0.5569 0.5896 0.6153 0.8063 0.7999 0.8063 
Panel C       
Dependent Variable: Age Charges/Population       
=1 if Appointed -4.206 -3.871 -2.996 -4.423 -4.831 -5.405 
 (1.198) (1.325) (1.149) (0.567) (0.724) (1.172) 
Observations 1008 1008 1008 231 231 231 
R-squared 0.4956 0.5064 0.5345 0.813 0.8094 0.8114 
Panel D       
Dependent Variable: Disability Charges/Population       
=1 if Appointed -3.361 -3.222 -3.020 7.287 7.237 2.913 
 (1.871) (2.763) (1.684) (3.453) (2.655) (10.304) 
Observations 384 384 384 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.4197 0.443 0.6306 0.8836 0.8822 0.8784 
       
Controls Demog Demog, Laws Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Fixed effects Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year Region, Year Region, Year Region, Year 
Instrument Variables Specification No No No No GMM JIVE 
 
Note:  Standard errors reported in parentheses. All regressions use robust standard errors.  Columns (1) – (4) and (6) are clustered by 
state.  Coefficients in bold are statistically significant a p-value <0.01.  Coefficients in bold and italics are statistically significant at a 
p-value<0.05.  Coefficients in italics are statistically significant at a p-value<0.10.  The regressions reported in Columns (4) through 
(6) cover only regions 2 and 5. 
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Table 8: Analysis of Selection v. Incentive Differences in Judicial Selection 
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Charges per 
State based on Type of Discrimination 
Total  Total  Race Race Gender Gender Age Age Disability Disability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
=1 if Judge Initially Appointed 3.601 -11.086 0.947 -9.203 1.275 -1.871 1.600 -2.101 1.810 -1.737 
 (3.607) (4.229) (1.375) (2.105) (0.806) (0.907) (0.858) (1.004) (1.178) (1.628) 
=1 if Retention Election Used  17.987  12.431  3.853  4.462  4.128 
  (6.243)  (2.124)  (1.413)  (1.311)  (1.564) 
           
Controls Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Demog, 
Laws, Court 
Fixed effects Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year Region*Year 
Observations 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 1344 1008 1008 384 384 
R-squared 0.6900 0.7100 0.8042 0.8359 0.6157 0.6284 0.5300 0.5500 0.6325 0.5340 
 
Note:  Standard errors reported in parentheses.  Coefficients in bold are significant at a p-value <0.01.  Coefficients in bold and italics 
are significant at a p-value<0.05. All regressions report robust standard errors that are clustered on state.  The regressions include 
states in all regions as there is variation in type of selection method when one differentiates between appointed, elected, and hybrid 
methods.  The measure “judge initially appointed” groups the states in which an appointed or hybrid selection method is used.   
 
 
 
 
 
